The Security of Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones: The Middle East as a Test Case for Unconditional Security Assurances

Abstract

A just nuclear order based on voluntary abstinence by states and the promotion of nuclear weapon-free zones would require more credible negative security assurances than provided by the current non-proliferation regime. The question here is: how to create the necessary conditions for such a change? The negative security assurances issued to the non-nuclear states in general and to the existing regional nuclear weapon-free zones in particular are reviewed. These are analysed in relation to their conditionality and ambiguity in order to understand the security provided. On this basis, possible options to achieve unconditional, legally based security assurances collectively for all the zone states are presented. These assurances could potentially be a tool to increase the number of non-nuclear states and nuclear weapon-free zones, especially in cases where there are one or several nuclear weapon states. Currently, the most acute example is the one in the Middle East. The lack of progress in this case will haunt the NPT review conferences and deepen the crisis until some positive steps take place. In case unconditional, legal security assurances are agreed to, these could provide an interim first phase for the WMD-free zone in the Middle East and allow for some of the disagreements among the participants to at least be discussed. The model here would be the transformation of the hostile relations between Brazil and Argentina initiated by the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

Keywords

• Negative security assurances
• calculated ambiguity
• NPT-withdrawal
• Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
• nuclear weapon-free zones
• WMD-free Middle East