Kējì Fǎxué Pínglùn (Dec 2013)
從證券法觀點觀察強制公開揭露理論的界線與替代模型 Boundary of Mandatory Disclosure in Securities Law and Its Alternatives: A Perspective
Abstract
證券法上的資訊強制定期公開，長久以來從1933 年的Securities Act、1934 年的Securities Exchange Act 以降，一直被視為美國證券法的主幹。七十多年發展下來，大體上仍在此一精神下持續擴張；觀念上，資訊的公開揭露也都被化約認為是保障投資人與交易市場秩序的最佳武器。而相同的邏輯，也為我國證券法所沿襲。但此種管制方式，與其長久以來在具體制度中呈現的支配現象相反，在學界裡一直有著懷疑與挑戰的聲音。主要的討論，在於強制性提供是否必要、資訊的最佳化與其效應、以及強制提供資訊是否真的提供了充分的保障等等。準此，本文從反對的角度出發，試著由個案與理論的路徑，針對現行強制揭露所面臨的限制進行討論。並希望藉此反對見解的闡述與分析，反省此一由 Brandeis 從新政時期（New Deal Era）以降理論的支配地位，並思考下一個世代證券法領域可能的管制思維。 Securities laws are, in reality, a congeries of mandated disclosure. The underlying assumption is that a well-functioning securities market needs to aggregate information. Individual investor in this market then can benefit from more disclosure as this team-work of market—information, allow investors make the decision according to their best interest. This reasoning is followed both in the United States and Taiwan persistently. But the prevalence of mandatory disclosure in securities laws is not accepted without challenge. On the one hand, the failure of mandatory disclosure is well documented in many empirical studies in securities laws as well as in many other areas of law. On the other hand, the critics of its theoretical foundation continuously question mandatory disclosure’s effect and necessity. Using the benefit of these criticisms, this article first examines the nature of securities transaction and how the intended audience/participants interact with the information circulated in the securities market. With the attempt to understand the limits of mandatory disclosure regime, this article secondly explores the deficiency in the ideological foundation of mandatory disclosure, which can be traced back to Former Justice Brandeis in the early 1910s. Last, an agenda for future reform is proposed to better meet the need of “efficiency” in the ever-changing world of transaction.
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