CIVIL PROCEDURE TECHNIQUE AND (DE)LIMITATIONS OF THE POWERS OF THE JUDGES: CONTRIBUTIONS FROM A HERMENEUTICAL READING OF THE CIVIL PROCEDURAL LAW

Abstract

THIS essay, under a hermeneutic-phenomenological “method”, will reflect upon the tradition of the disposition principle (legal principle which states that the judge cannot produce evidence ex officio), aiming to unveil that said principle was originally developed with the intent of limiting judicial discretion, and not to admit ex officio judicial acts. From that, and with the established premise that there actually is a space on the “procedural technique” for ex officio acts, this work seeks to demonstrate that the limited apophantic-dogmatic analyses of the (de)limitations of the power of the judges end up by supporting an excessive and antidemocratic space of discretion for the judging institution.

Keywords

• Disposition principle
• procedural technique
• procedural dogmatic
• Hermeneutical Critique of Law
• judicial discretion.