Incentive Mechanism and Resource Allocation for Edge-Fog Networks Driven by Multi-Dimensional Contract and Game Theories

Abstract

The edge computing paradigm has become extremely popular over the past years, as a means of offloading computationally intensive tasks by users of resource and battery-constrained devices. Nevertheless, the edge networks’ overexploitation by the ever-increasing number of task-offloading users, gradually leads to their performance degradation. In this paper, we leverage on the different levels of available computing capabilities across the network, and we design an incentive mechanism that aims to shift the selfish users’ preference from the edge to the upper fog computing layer, accounting for their level of delay tolerance. To deal with the users’ heterogeneity in terms of their applications’ multi-dimensional distinctive features (including their delay tolerance/sensitivity), a multi-dimensional contract theory modeling is adopted, according to which the edge server determines the bundles of the users’ provided efforts and corresponding offered rewards. In this respect, each user’s effort represents the amount of its initially offloaded task at the edge that is allowed to be further forwarded and processed at the fog. Considering that the users-to-edge server offloading is performed under Non-Orthogonal Multiple Access (NOMA), the problem of joint computation task offloading and uplink transmission power allocation is subsequently addressed via a Stackelberg game, where the edge server and the users are treated as leader and followers, respectively. The aim of the game is to minimize the end-to-end network’s energy consumption and increase its resource utilization efficiency. The incentive mechanism and resource allocation framework is evaluated via modeling and simulation regarding its operation and efficiency under different scenarios.

Keywords

• Computation offloading
• edge-fog networks
• game theory
• incentive mechanism
• multi-dimensional contract theory