Moral facts as facts of life

Abstract

This article seeks to interpret moral facts as facts of life using the cognitivist naturalist approach set out by Philippa Foot in her Natural Goodness. It outlines the main features of the non-cognitivist rejection of the existence and observability of moral facts. It then reconstructs Foot’s conception of the natural normativity that is articulated in natural historical judgements, which can then be used to define a good or a defective individual with regard to what is exemplary of a life form. Hence Foot highlights a type of evaluation that is not dependent on our pro/con attitudes or emotional states. Practical rationality is tied up with the word ‘good’, which obtains its content from manifestations of the human life form and is aimed at the good life. This article shows that it is only in spheres that directly or indirectly concern life that it makes sense to talk of moral goodness or badness and that facts of life are moral facts.

Keywords

• moral facts
• natural good
• life
• practical rationality
• p. foot