Proposing a Stackelberg mathematical model for weapon-target assignment considering both air and ground attacks

Abstract

Optimal assignment of equipment for disposal of targets, often referred to as a weapon assignment problem, has become one of the main centers of modern military thought. Weapon Target Assignment (WTA) is based on consideration of the principle of saving on resources, without reducing the power of systems and systems always to protect vital infrastructure. The critical infrastructure consists of the physical assets of a system, resulting in a significant disruption to operational and operational systems. In this study, a Stackelberg a mathematical model is presented to manage battle scenes. The Stackelberg model is considered to be a strategic game and an incomplete competition. The game is considered to consist of two actors (Enemy and Power), each striving to optimize its goals. Considering air and ground forces simultaneously, consider the assets of both the friendly and the enemy, including the innovations considered in this study. In this study, a two- level Stackelberg model has been presented and after linearization, the two- level model has been developed using Karush–Kuhn–Tucker conditions (KKT) to the ordinary one –level model. Finally to show the performance of the model, some examples are solved using GAMS software.

Keywords

• weapon target assignment
• battle scene management
• game theory
• stackelberg mathematical model
• optimization conditions of karush kuhn tucker