Die phänomenologische Selbstgegebenheit: eine bloße Metapher? Ein Essay im Ausgang von Benoists "Éléments de philosophie réaliste"

Abstract

The sole aim of this paper is to approach Benoists conception of realism in his latest work Éléments de philosophie réaliste (2011) by analysing his sharp criticism of the phenomenological concept of (self)-givenness. If it is true that we ‘have’ reality – i.e. if reality is always already present to us – why should we have to ask how it is (self-)given to us? (Self-) givenness is nothing more than a vestige of representationalism, i.e. a mere epistemological form of access to reality that is not relevant from the point of view of Benoist’s contextual realism. According to this view, givenness is a mere metaphor.

Keywords

• Jocelyn Benoist
• Contextual Realism
• Representationalism
• Criticism of (Self-)Givenness