Dominant shareholders, board structure and bank performance: Evidence from Serbia

Abstract

We investigate relation between board structure (size and composition) and bank performance in 18 Serbian commercial banks with a dominant shareholder in 2006-2010. We analyze this relation using OLS regression analysis on an unbalanced panel dataset of 75 observations. We find no significant relation between proportion of independent directors on the board and bank performance. We also find no significant relation between bank market performance and board size. We find that bank profitability, measured by ROA and ROE, increase as the number of directors on the board decreases. This result is statistically significant after controlling for endogenous variables and unobserved macroeconomic effects. We conclude that Serbian banks with dominant shareholder should put limits on board size. The relation between bank performance and ownership concentration ratio is always negative, but significant only in case of ROA and ROE.

Keywords

• bank performance
• board structure
• commercial banks
• dominant shareholder