The fight against corruption in the territory: Territorial auditing and citizens’ perceptions and experiences of corruption in Colombia

Abstract

Over the last decades, the fight against corruption has taken a preponderant role in public opinion and in the citizens’ relations with state institutions in Latin America. This article assesses whether territorial auditing, namely, the auditing of the public budgets of local state entities, has contributed to making this phenomenon visible and disincentive acts of corruption that affect citizens. Estimating multilevel regression models with data from citizen surveys and administrative information from territorial comptrollers’ offices in Colombia showed that citizen perception of corruption is higher when territorial comptrollers’ offices are more efficient and effective. In addition, in territories where municipal comptroller’s offices are absent and the auditing is carried out by departmental offices, there is a higher probability that officials will request bribes from citizens who use their services.

Keywords

• corruption
• budgetary control
• local government
• latin america
• colombia