Information of incompatibility in voluntary health-care insurance market: A case study in dong thap province

Abstract

The information of incompatibility is a problem of economics which occurs regularly in markets, and is a phenomenon of failure of the market. As a result, it leads to a non-perfect market which causes adverse selections and moral hazard. Particularly, the information of incompatibility usually occurs in the health-care insurance market. The present study applied quantitative method with the model of quantitative economics to measure the existence of adverse selection and moral hazard on the market of insurance at a particular region (Dong Thap province). The results confirm the existence of the two problems, adverse selection and moral hazard, on the market of voluntary health-care insurance; then the study suggests some recommendations for limiting the consequences of those two problems.

Keywords

• thông tin bất đối xứng
• lựa chọn ngược
• rủi ro đạo đức và bảo hiểm y tế