Philosophie scientifique : origines et interprétations. Hans Reichenbach et le groupe de Berlin

Abstract

After recalling various contexts in which the notion of scientific philosophy emerged and gained momentum in the nineteenth century in Germany, the article aims at describing Reichenbach’s view on the subject as distinct from that of several members of the Vienna Circle. In particular, I show an epistemological and institutional connection between Reichenbach’s circle in Berlin and Hilbert’s in Göttingen. I also draw connections between specific traits of Reichenbach’s viewpoint and the regional one developed by the French historical epistemology. Hilbert’s axiomatic method and metamathematics are certainly a common root for both Reichenbach’s orientation, as well as that of the French historical epistemology of mathematics. But the impact of relativity theory, quantum mechanics, as well as probability theory was no less important for the matter as it deeply renewed the concepts of time, space, substance, cause, and law by questioning the theses of Kantian transcendentalism and by focusing attention on effective scientific practices.