Kantianism and Thomistic Personalism on the Human Person: Self-Legislator or Self-Determiner?

Abstract

Inspired by a discussion about whether John Paul II grounded human dignity in a Kantian way, viz., emphasizing the person as an end unto itself, the author considers: (1) the relations between Kant and Aquinas on the topic of the philosophical basis of human dignity, and (2) John Paul II’s remarks on Kant’s ethics. He concludes that: (1) both Kant and Aquinas ground human dignity upon human freedom, but both understand the human freedom differently; (2) for Kant, human freedom is self-legislating and so exercised without rational direction; (3) the Thomistic notion of freedom is compatible with rational direction which consists, e.g., in the human understood as an intellector of being or as a willer of the good, though neither seem to be exploited by Wojtyla.

Keywords

• person
• dignity
• self-legislator
• self-determiner
• intellector of being
• willer of the good
• ethics
• freedom
• rationality
• reason
• will
• Immanuel Kant
• Thomas Aquinas
• John Paul II
• Karol Wojtyla