Evolutionarily stable payoff matrix in hawk–dove games

Abstract

Abstract Background Classical matrix game models aim to find the endpoint of behavioural evolution for a set of fixed possible interaction outcomes. Here, we introduce an evolutionary model in which not only the players’ strategies but also the payoff matrix evolves according to natural selection. Results We start out from the hawk–dove matrix game and, in a way that is consistent with the monomorphic model setup of Maynard Smith and Price, introduce an evolving phenotypic trait that quantifies fighting ability and determines the probability of winning and the cost of losing escalated hawk–hawk fights. We define evolutionarily stable phenotypes as consisting of an evolutionarily stable strategy and an evolutionarily stable trait, which in turn describes a corresponding evolutionarily stable payoff matrix. Conclusions We find that the maximal possible cost of escalating fights remains constant during evolution assuming a separation in the time scales of fast behavioural and slow trait selection, despite the fact that the final evolutionarily stable phenotype maximizes the payoff of hawk–hawk fights. Our results mirror the dual nature of Darwinian evolution whereby the criteria of evolutionary success, as well as the successful phenotypes themselves, are a product of natural selection.

Keywords

• Matrix game
• Trait evolution
• Hawk–dove game
• Asymmetric interaction