Œconomia (Mar 2011)

Arguments de choix rationnel et contractualisme : les cas symétriques de Rousseau et de Pareto

  • Emmanuel Picavet

DOI
https://doi.org/10.4000/oeconomia.1745
Journal volume & issue
Vol. 1, no. 2
pp. 215 – 237

Abstract

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This article holds an inquiry into Vilfredo Pareto’s profile as a rational-choice theorist who abstains from drawing conclusions from rational-choice analysis in the field of contractarian theory. The symmetrical case of Jean-Jacques Rousseau is also examined: the case of a theorist who, although he has been described (notably by David Gauthier) as a contractarian theorist who rejects the typical hypotheses we now associate with rational-choice analysis, turns out to make use of a wide array of arguments which remind us of rational-choice and even cost-efficiency analyses. It is argued that this is crucially related to contractarian argument in Rousseau’s work.

Keywords