Destined to lead nowhere? Venice, the Ottoman Empire and the Geography and Technology of War in the Early Modern Mediterranean, c. 1530–1715

Abstract

It was, or would have been, extremely difficult for Venice or Constantinople to instigate a “military revolution” in the early modern Mediterranean. Fortresses, harbours and ships-of-the-line faced numerous logistical, geographical and manpower limitations, while many garrisons lacked the resolve to defend their redoubts and keeps. Operational concerns (moving supplies, or finding water and horses) shaped campaign outcomes. The great powers were unable to fight in more than one theatre of action and depended upon the constant circulation of resources. Galleys were decisive. The mixed-vessel taskforce emerged as a polyvalent form of campaigning. On a strategic level, offensives in the Levant cannot be separated from events in central Europe. The Mediterranean remained in the limelight after 1580, in spite of the huge wastage involved in fighting. Conflicts were shaped by political, not military, priorities.