Raven paradox: problem and solution given on the basis of Aristotle’s logic

Abstract

The paper is devoted to the solution of two well-known paradoxes of inductive logic: Hempel’s and Goodman’s, which the science has not solved unambiguously yet. The results of this research can be used in any natural science, but they are especially relevant for areas where there is an emphasis placed on environmental friendliness and sustainable development. The central problem of this research is the problem of limits of applying classical logic laws. The problem is solved by method of reduction of logical laws to those cases where they, according to Aristotle, act faultlessly, and refusal of their recognition in the cases where their action is questionable. The aim of the paper is to demonstrate the solution of both problems within Aristotle’s logic. In that regard, the following results are received: common faults of previous solutions of Hempel’s paradox, consisting in ignoring any of its parties, are revealed; the original nature of Goodman’s paradox, consisting in wrong interpreting “inductive confirmation” criteria is opened; two methods of forming and assessing the subject volumes of statements are revealed: analytical and synthetical ones; it is proved that the theses treated in Hempel’s paradox as equivalent ones are not always so, but only on condition of their subjects’ reality and of their subject volumes’ identity; it is established that the conditions of the statement equivalence correspond to the limits of applying logic laws in Aristotle’s interpretation.