Content Quality Assurance on Media Platforms with User-Generated Content

Abstract

This paper develops a duopoly model for user-generated content (UGC) platforms, which compete for consumers and content producers in two-sided markets characterized by network externalities. Each platform has the option to invest in a content quality assurance (CQA) system and determine the level of advertising. Our model reveals that network effects are pivotal in shaping the platforms’ optimal strategies and user behavior, specifically in terms of single vs. multi-homing. We find that when network effects for producers are weak, consumers tend to engage in multi-homing while producers prefer single-homing. Conversely, strong network effects lead to the opposite behavior. Furthermore, our model demonstrates that user behavior and network effects dictate whether a platform is incentivized to incorporate advertisements and/or invest in CQA. Generally, weak network effects prompt a platform to invest in a CQA system, unless both consumers and producers engage in multi-homing. Our model’s results highlight the importance for platform companies to evaluate the extent of network effects on their platform in order to anticipate user behavior, which subsequently informs the optimal CQA and advertising strategy.

Keywords

• UGC platform
• two-sided market
• multi-homing
• network externalities
• platform investment