Il fondamento e la struttura generale della presupposizione

Abstract

The article holds the idea that the antifoundational stance does not coincide with the dismissal of the question concerning the foundation. The quest for a philosophical foundation belongs, in fact, to the core of the philosophical praxis. To renounce questioning the structure of grounding would mean to give up with the critical stance that characterizes philosophy as such. This critical stance implies a continuous work of deconstruction of what I call the general structure of presupposition. The latter is entailed both in chains of events – every event is related to a broader network of events – andin set of statements concerning the world – every act of judgement is related to a bulk of knowledge that the subject presupposes before uttering a single statement about whatever it occurs. Starting from some very well-known passages taken from Husserl’s work the article shows how the inquiry about the structures of foundation has both an ontological and an epistemological relevance. Finally, the Husserlian concept of Foundierung offers the opportunity to show how the phenomenological method of grounding concretely works. The point is not to offer causal explanations of what there is in the world, it is rather to show the relationship between facticity and function in a non-reductionistic way.