End-to-End Authenticated Key Exchange Based on Different Physical Unclonable Functions

Abstract

We propose the first authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol with different physical unclonable functions (PUFs). Our protocol allows for two end-users each holding a distinct PUF-embedded device and a long-term secret to agree to an authenticated session key. For malicious behaviors on the PUF-embedded device, we first define a Device query, which models an adversary who intentionally (or unintentionally) picks up an arbitrary device and attempts to input a message and obtain an output. As per the author's knowledge, this is the first study to consider Corrupt queries that return long-term secrets in the PUF-embedded device and its relevant platform. In this paper, we prove that our protocol is secure under a new security model and requires three flows to achieve a secure AKE with users' distinct PUFs. As it requires no intervention by a central server after its initial setup phase, it is suitable for practical decentralized networks.

Keywords

• Physical unclonable function
• authentication
• device authentication
• authenticated key exchange