Free Riding of Vehicle Companies under Dual-Credit Policy: An Agent-Based System Dynamics Model

Abstract

The dual-credit policy promotes green transition in automobile companies. This paper investigates the dual-credit policy framework in the Chinese automotive industry, with a focus on the phenomenon of free riding. This occurs when traditional vehicle manufacturers within an alliance benefit from the excess credits generated by a transitioning vehicle company without fully committing to their own green transitioning. The focus of this study lies on an alliance constituted by a transitioning vehicle company in partnership with two traditional vehicle manufacturers, all interconnected via equity ties. Utilizing an agent-based system dynamics model, this study explores the strategic behaviors emerging from such credit collaborations and their consequent effects on operational efficiency and financial performance. The findings reveal that 1. free riding negatively impacts the transitioning company’s revenue but benefits the alliance by easing transition pressures and boosting collective performance; 2. stricter policies increase intra-alliance credit transfers and performance, while lower credit prices reduce transfer value and harm the transitioning company’s earnings. This study implies that transitioning vehicle companies with equity-linked partners can benefit from a nuanced understanding of how policy mechanisms interact with alliance dynamics under free riding. By adjusting credit transfer strategies in line with market conditions and policy trends, they can better navigate the dual-credit policy landscape, balancing individual profitability with the needs of the broader alliance and long-term sustainability goals.

Keywords

• dual-credit policy
• system dynamics
• horizontal alliance
• free riding