ASSOCIATIVE AND (OR) ROLE POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS: A CRITIQUE OF DWORKIN'S THEORY FOR THE OBEDIENCE OF LAW BY CITIZENS AND JUDGES

Abstract

Objective: I suggest that Ronald Dworkin's theory of associative political obligations, known for justifying moral obedience to law by citizens, especially judges, is incorrect. Associative theories propose that the bond formed between individuals in social practices is the factor responsible for justifying moral obligations. However, associative ties will prove to be incompatible with the socio-political context, especially regarding the role played by judges. Methodology: I present a critical-reflective exposition of the main arguments for and against Dworkin's associative obligations. The theoretical discussion assumes assumptions of analytic philosophy, where I proceed with a normative analysis about this type of obligation. Results: I try to demonstrate how associative reasons that underlie the theory under discussion are motivated by more intimate and partial social relationships between individuals. Hence, they would be incompatible with the kind of moral and political obligation expected between citizens and judges. Contributions: the arguments discussed outline the limits and scope of theories based on associative obligations. They also allow for a more careful reflection on the normative justification of the political obligations of citizens and judges.

Keywords

• obrigações políticas
• razões associativas
• razões de papel
• ética profissional
• decisões judiciais