Rational preference knowledge influence on the evolutionary equilibrium of carbon reduction negotiation: An exploration based on timed petri net

Abstract

In the digital economy age, carbon emission reduction is perhaps the most crucial contribution affecting national activities and international negotiations. In a potential carbon reduction conflict, a rational participant expects to select a suitable strategic opinion to reach another state with improved benefit. Participants’ preferences reflect their priority ranking on multiple possible conflict solutions, directly determining the evolutionary direction and equilibrium solutions. Referring to the potential carbon reduction conflicts, Timed Petri Net for Conflict Analysis (TPNCA) is proposed as a graphical tool to explore participants’ rational preferences, state transformation, and conflict evolutionary equilibrium. The generation rule of TPNCA is designed according to carbon reduction co-operators’ rational preference knowledge. From the long-term perspective, dynamic unilateral improvement is proposed to reflect decision-makers’ strategic initiative willingness to reach end nodes. Dynamic equilibrium conditions are conducted to determine the final stability state for a conflict. This study reveals how participants’ preference knowledge and time constraints influence conflict evolutionary and dynamic equilibria. Climate group should positively engage in carbon reduction negotiations and flexibly adjust national tasks, according to real-time carbon reduction contributions. This study (1) reveals the influence of preference knowledge on conflict evolution, (2) explores the role of time constraints in determining a terminated node, (3) proposes dynamic equilibrium from the long-term perspective, and (4) helps guide participants’ strategic decision-making for mutually solving carbon reduction.

Keywords

• D83
• E37
• C73
• D58