The Position of Sense in Ibn Sina's Epistemology (The Empiricism of Avicenna)

Abstract

Philosophers consider sense as a means for true cognition. In spite of the fact that Islamic philosophy are generally regarded as rational philosophy, it does not mean that they do not assume epistemological value for sense. To some of them, including Ibn Sina, sense is extremely important. In the present article, I argue that the role of sense in Ibn Sina's epistemological system is very significant although the I would not consider Ibn Sina as an empiricist in the sense that Hume is in the Western philosophy. Rather, I consider Ibn Sina empiricism similar to the theory of Locke. It is due to the fact that Ibn Sina considers the human mind as a tabula rasa with no actual data at the birth. It is believed that with sense the knowledge begins. In addition, in this study, by taking into the account of both empirical and rational criteria (in Ibn Sina's epistemological system), it is ultimately accentuated that in the most cases, Ibn Sina's tendency is found to be more toward empiricism. In another part of the paper, the role of sense in the realm of the concepts and affirmation (sensory and rational) is explained. It is concluded that sensory conceptions are the outcomes of sense. Other ideas (concepts) are mediated by sense; sensory affirmations immediately come from sense and in rational affirmations, sense plays a role as an introduction. In sum, this is the explanation of Ibn Sina's statement: "Whoever has no sense will have no knowledge"

Keywords

• affirmations
• avicenna or ibn sina
• empiricism
• concepts
• knowledge
• sense
• sense perception