Journal of Cybersecurity and Privacy (Nov 2023)
Challenging Assumptions of Normality in AES s-Box Configurations under Side-Channel Analysis
Abstract
Power-based Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) began with visual-based examinations and has progressed to utilize data-driven statistical analysis. Two distinct classifications of these methods have emerged over the years; those focused on leakage exploitation and those dedicated to leakage detection. This work primarily focuses on a leakage detection-based schema that utilizes Welch’s t-test, known as Test Vector Leakage Assessment (TVLA). Both classes of methods process collected data using statistical frameworks that result in the successful exfiltration of information via SCA. Often, statistical testing used during analysis requires the assumption that collected power consumption data originates from a normal distribution. To date, this assumption has remained largely uncontested. This work seeks to demonstrate that while past studies have assumed the normality of collected power traces, this assumption should be properly evaluated. In order to evaluate this assumption, an implementation of Tiny-AES-c with nine unique substitution-box (s-box) configurations is conducted using TVLA to guide experimental design. By leveraging the complexity of the AES algorithm, a sufficiently diverse and complex dataset was developed. Under this dataset, statistical tests for normality such as the Shapiro-Wilk test and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test provide significant evidence to reject the null hypothesis that the power consumption data is normally distributed. To address this observation, existing non-parametric equivalents such as the Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test and the Kruskal-Wallis Test are discussed in relation to currently used parametric tests such as Welch’s t-test.
Keywords