Theoretical-game analysis of the variants of the fourth operator entering the telecommunication market of Russia

Abstract

Objective: to analyze the possible distribution structures of mobile communication traffic and profit in the Russian telecommunications market for the entrance of a fourth mobile operator.Methods: game theory and economic and mathematical modeling.Results: the article examines the oligopolistic market of telecommunications services, whose participants are largely affected by the appearance of a new participant in the market. The main solutions of oligopolists were considered using game theory and reflection analysis. Based on the linear model of the game of oligopolistic market agents, possible variants of equilibriums in the market game of four oligopolists with different ranks of strategic reflection were investigated. The modeling of information balances between agents in the Russian telecommunications market was carried out, which was used to determine the possible strategies for improving the market positions of mobile operators. Analytical formulas for calculating the estimated variations and equilibrium distributions of market share and profit for a market of four agents were derived, which creates additional practical value. The conclusions were made that the size of marginal costs is a decisive advantage when entering the market. It was also determined that the operators with prospective views compared to others gain advantage in the market distribution. Scientific novelty: analytical formulas for calculating the estimated variations and equilibrium distributions of market shares and profits in the game of oligopoly are derived for the case of four agents with different cost functions.Practical significance: the calculated information equilibriums can be used to make comparisons with the Russian telecommunications market structure in order to determine the type of operators’ reflexive behavior. The developed models of information equilibrium and market agents’ behavior are also applicable to other Russian markets.

Keywords

• economics and national economy management
• reflexive game
• oligopoly
• cournot - stackelberg equilibrium
• telecommunications market