Whether corporate social responsibility is used to suppress earnings management practices and could corporate governance mechanisms prevent them? An empirical study

Abstract

Purpose – This study examines whether managers adopt corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosures to suppress earnings management practices and whether corporate governance mechanisms could limit such practices. Design/methodology/approach – A quantitative approach was followed, in which secondary data from listed firms from 2014 to 2019 were gathered. Descriptive statistics and inferential techniques were performed, which included correlation, ordered logistic regression and 2SLS panel regression analyses. Findings – The findings indicate that firms use CSR disclosure to conceal managers' opportunistic behaviour via earnings management as an entrenchment strategy and that corporate governance mechanisms could significantly constrain such behaviour. Research limitations/implications – This study goes beyond the conventional agency theory by incorporating additional theoretical perspectives from stakeholder and legitimacy theories, resulting in a multi-theoretical perspective in conceptualizing the study. Practical implications – The findings are expected to have significant policy implications, especially in limiting the opportunistic use of CSR disclosures and reducing earnings management practices to safeguard stakeholders' interests and ensure the sustainability of business entities. Originality/value – The levels of CSR and board governance practices are captured using comprehensive indices. Moreover, earnings management was operationalized using both accrual-based and real earnings management proxies. Furthermore, while addressing an empirical dearth noted, the findings provide significant policy implications for limiting managers' opportunistic and unethical use of CSR disclosures with corporate governance mechanisms.

Keywords

• Corporate governance
• Corporate social responsibility
• Earnings management
• Entrenchment strategy
• GRI