The Conception of Actuality in Aristotle's Theory of Soul

Abstract

In Metaphysics Theta, Aristotle uses entelecheia (ἐντελέχεια) and energeia (ενέργεια) in contrast with dunamis (δύναμις, potency) in discussing the distinction between "actuality" and "potentiality" (both Greek terms, entelecheia and energeia, are typically translated as "actuality" in English). Aristotle's most influential application of "actuality" (entelecheia) is his claim in the second book of De Anima (On the Soul) that the soul is the "actuality" of an organic body that makes it alive. Aristotle uses the notion of "first actuality" in his definition of the soul. In fact, the soul is the "first actuality" of a natural body that is potentially alive. The "first actuality" is a kind of potentiality, while its exercise of function is its fuller or "second actuality". Aristotle’s analogy of proportion is used to explain the nature of the soul, as the "first actuality" of a natural body, and its relation to the body. The present study aims to contribute to understanding of the meaning of "actuality" in Aristotle's definition of the soul, especially in its quality of being "first", i.e. the "first actuality", and its relation to the "second actuality", as well as the role of analogy (analogia) in Aristotle's definition of the soul.

Keywords

• soul؛ analogy؛ Aristotle
• Actuality
• actualization