Czym są tak zwane tezy Traktatu? Drabina Wittgensteina

Abstract

The main objective of my article is the presentation and critical analysis of two possible interpretations of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. I juxtapose the so-called resolute reading with the metaphysical reading. The crucial dissimilarity between these interpretations is that they ascribe different roles to the sentences contained in the Tractatus. According to the metaphysical reading, these sentences – although they are nonsensical from the point of view of the Tractatus – attempt to express a certain view of reality and language, whereas according to the resolute reading, these sentences are mere nonsense and only seem to make sense; they exemplify nonsense and therefore show the nonsensicality of philosophical theories. I consider the objections against both interpretations and point out that although the resolute reading adequately presents and explains many questions concerning Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, it requires essential modifications. In the last part of my article, I suggest that the sentences of the Tractatus do not function as propositions but as rules of translation.

Keywords

• nonsense
• resolute reading
• rules of translation
• Wittgenstein