Substanční dualismus a moderní technologie čtení mysli z mozku

Abstract

The author compares concrete dualistic conceptions of the mind with an argument for neural dependence based on a new success in mapping brain activity. The result is an uncovering of the fallacies of this latter argument and a provisioning of insights valid for dualism and the philosophy of mind in general. In 2018, Adrin Nestor’s team published their breakthroughs in brain-reading in visual perception using EEG. Similar advances in neuroscience bolster an argumentative strategy that Paul Churchland refers to as the neural dependency argument. The author polemically compares this argumentation with the theses of the prominent dualist Richard Swinburne. Subsequently, he concludes that the failure of the neural dependence argument in this comparison is due to an overestimation of the theoretical implications of modern neuroscience, a misunderstanding of dualism and the inability to define the boundaries of the physical dependency of the mental. In the concluding portion of the article, general consequences are drawn from the comparison between the two opposing positions referred to above: opponents of dualism commit a circular argument as they consider interactionism to be a condition of dualism. They confuse identity for coincidence, correlation and causation. Last but not least, they also unjustifiably identify the place of appearance with the place of occurrence.

Keywords

• mind
• consciousness
• brain
• eeg
• neural dependency argument
• substance dualism