Phenomenological community and integrative social agency: Critique of a phenomenological concept of inter-subjectivity

Abstract

The term „phenomenological community“ is not among the most well-known concepts of phenomenology. It was used by Marc Richir referring to Merleau-Ponty’s concept of „natural“ community. The paper examines this concept from the point of view of social philosophy. It analyses its relevance in the context of a post-Hegelian philosophy of inter-subjectivity. The community conceived this way is origin and result at the same time, giving rise to a theory of a historically grounded formation of a previously not given and heterogeneous communicative integration; moreover, social mediation defining the subject of action is an open, non-totalizing process, which makes it possible to conceptualize an integrative action that does not neutralize the heterogeneity of the contemporary society. The theory of the phenomenological community is the ontology of a disintegrated but common world. Social action never happens on the basis of chaos but of the inter-subjective world, thus it can provide a new basis for such an action. On the other hand the „phenomenological community“ is essentially a form of the „passive synthesis“ thus it is unable to provide foundation for a unifying action, the only possibility for an authentic integration (a non-representative form of social integration). Thus it necessitates a critique.

Keywords

• Inter-subjectivity
• Marc Richir
• Maurice Merleau-Ponty
• nature
• infinity
• phenomenology
• social philosophy
• integration