Spoofing Control Strategy for Precise Position Offset Based on INS/GNSS Tightly Coupled Navigation

Abstract

To deceive Inertial Navigation System(INS)/Global Navigation Satellite System(GNSS) integrated navigation terminals, the entry point is still to inject GNSS spoofing signals to the target system. However, the spoofing control strategy in integrated navigation mode for particular tasks such as fixed-point capture or directional drive needs further research. Whether applying GNSS spoofing attacks or not, the Kalman filter correction gain matrix element in the tightly coupled navigation system always maintains its stability, which gives us valuable clues to develop an effective spoofing attack. On this basis, this article focuses on the feasibility and operability of spoofing attacks under tightly coupled navigation conditions and innovatively proposes a spoofing control strategy that can achieve accurate position offsets: Specific spoofing signals are implanted to the target tightly coupled navigation terminal at the beginning of the spoofing attack. The amounts of pseudo-range spoofing signals corresponding to different satellites are respectively the projections of the position increments to be deceived on the sight vector of the integrated navigation terminal to each satellite. Simulation experiments and tightly coupled navigation terminal experiments verify the correctness and effectiveness of the spoofing control strategy.

Keywords

• INS/GNSS tightly coupled navigation
• spoofing control strategy
• steady state gain matrix
• GNSS spoofing signal
• precise position offset