Crença no mundo exterior: um diálogo entre Hume e Berkeley

Abstract

In the Treatise, Hume intends to investigate the causes that induce us to believe in the existence of the body, admitting it is possible to prove if such a thing exists or not. His analysis will consist in investigating the origin of the intelligibility of the notions of continuity and distinction of sensible objects, which is, to say, the belief of the common sense in the continuity and distinction of its own perceptions. This paper aims to demonstrate that this humean discussion is a direct dialogue with Berkeley. Hume’s defense of the belief in matter initially implicating in accepting, to some degree, Berkeley’s philosophy to, further on, turn into a direct opposition to his fundamental principle: esse is percipi. Such statements have, among others, the purpose of arguing that Berkeley plays a central role in humean philosophy, in this particular case, as his direct, immediate interlocutor, and that the understanding of this role is an obligatory part in making the objectivity problem, in Hume, more clear.

Keywords

• Belief
• Common sense
• xternal objects
• Skepticism