Testing the Rational-Actor Model: Interbureaucratic Politics in Mexican Foreign Policy 1989-1994

Abstract

This article argues that it is not always external factors that explain the international behavior of even an underdeveloped country. The article suggests that in the case of Mexico the origin of changes in foreign policy made during Carlos Salinas’ administration lay in the decision of the governing team to strengthen the policy of liberalization in the areas of trade and finance, reversing the Third-World positions that had until the mid-80’s characterized the country’s image abroad. To that effect, the model of the rationalactor is proposed as a theoretical framework or explaining the orientation of Mexican foreign policy in the period 1989-1994, and the President and his technocratic team are put forward as the main sources of these changes. Because the rational actor model hasbeen criticized for not sufficiently taking into account interactions among bureaucratic entities, this article seeks to analyze Mexican foreign policy using Allison’s bureaucratic policy model. Under this model, foreign policy results from pulling and hauling betweenbureaucratic entities, which hope to further their own interests. In the case of Mexico, the Foreign Service (affected negatively by the new orientation and mechanisms of foreign policy) on the one hand and the ministries charged with economic reform (the apparent promoters of change) on the other are identified as the relevant bureaucratic entities. Results suggest that apparently consensus more than negotiation defined the behavior of the members of the Foreign Service in relation to the Mexican Cabinet. Thus, it is difficultto explain the orientation of Mexican foreign policy from 1989 to 1994 in terms of the bureaucratic policy model, which would tend to validate the rational actor model.