Optimization of bidding strategy for leasing energy storage of wind farm clusters considering frequency regulation performance

Abstract

Wind farm clusters can enhance their operational profitability while supporting grid frequency regulation by participating in frequency regulation markets through the leasing of energy storage. To achieve this， a game-theoretic optimization bidding model is proposed for leasing energy storage of wind farm clusters， considering frequency regulation performance indicator assessment. The model consists of two layers： the upper layer models the bidding process in the frequency regulation market with multiple participants， while the lower layer models a leader-follower game between energy storage lessors and wind farm clusters regarding leasing price and capacity. In this game， the energy storage operator acts as the leader， setting the leasing price in response to the leasing plan of wind farm clusters， and the wind farm clusters， as the follower， adjust the leasing plan according to the price. Additionally， an evolutionary threshold public goods game model is embedded within the wind farm clusters to address the cooperation dilemma caused by selfish behavior among individual members. By united solution of the model， the bidding strategy for leasing energy storage capacity and participating in the frequency regulation market is obtained. The case study results demonstrate that the proposed strategy effectively resolves the cooperation dilemma and enhances the overall profitability of the wind farm clusters.

Keywords

• frequency regulation performance indicator assessment
• leasing energy storage
• multi-agent bidding
• leader-follower game
• revolutionary threshold public goods game