Enhancing strategic decision-making in differential games through bifurcation prediction

Abstract

Abstract Qualitative changes can occur in the dynamics of nonlinear systems even for small parameter variations. Such changes are manifestations of bifurcation in dynamical systems. In the context of differential game theory, bifurcations offer insights into the underlying mechanisms driving strategic interactions and identify transitions between different types of behavior. Such critical transitions are tipping points that can dramatically change the outcomes of the game. This work explores the possibility of predicting such qualitative shifts, including supercritical Hopf bifurcations, before they occur using a data-driven forecasting technique. This concept is demonstrated for an attacker–defender game in a limited resource scenario and for an active cybersecurity defense game. The time histories of the system dynamics as it approaches a bifurcation allow one player to detect the existence of bifurcations. This capability provides that player insights into the dynamics of the game and potential defense mechanisms in resource-constrained scenarios.

Keywords

• Game theory
• Forecasting
• Nonlinear dynamics
• Cybersecurity
• Differential games
• Bifurcations