The subject matter of the article is a short reflection on the concept of truth in criminal proceedings. The author raises the question about the manner of understanding the truth in a criminal trial, as well as about the relation of truth to proof and probability - are such concepts compatible, mutually exclusive or differentiated in terms of categories? As a result of such contemplation, the author decided that the text of Article 2 § 2 of the Code of Crimi¬nal Procedure concerning material truth - in view of the today’s criminal law scholars and commentators - is similar to the concept of ontological truth, i.e. the understanding of truth in a way that does not refer to the state of affairs only (ontic truth), but also to the statements and judgements made with respect thereto. Such an understanding of truth also allows one to acknowledge the fact that the truth and belief that a certain event (that needs to be proven or made plausible) occurred are two different epistemic categories.