Nash equilibria in risk-sensitive Markov stopping games under communication conditions

Abstract

This paper analyzes the existence of Nash equilibrium in a discrete-time Markov stopping game with two players. At each decision point, Player Ⅱ is faced with the choice of either ending the game and thus granting Player Ⅰ a final reward or letting the game continue. In the latter case, Player Ⅰ performs an action that affects transitions and receives a running reward from Player Ⅱ. We assume that Player Ⅰ has a constant and non-zero risk sensitivity coefficient, while Player Ⅱ strives to minimize the utility of Player Ⅰ. The effectiveness of decision strategies was measured by the risk-sensitive expected total reward of Player Ⅰ. Exploiting mild continuity-compactness conditions and communication-ergodicity properties, we found that the value function of the game is described as a single fixed point of the equilibrium operator, determining a Nash equilibrium. In addition, we provide an illustrative example in which our assumptions hold.

Keywords

• markov stopping games
• risk-sensitive total expected reward
• hitting time
• certainty equivalent
• birth-and-death chains