The Possibility of the Rational Knowledge of God in the Teachings of Hakīm Sabzawārī

Abstract

The question of ‘knowability of God’ is not a major topic in the works of traditional Muslim philosophers, as if taken for granted. Despite his critical view of ‘those who divest God of His Attributes’ (mu’attila) - hence, actually divest the concept of God of all conceivability - Hakīm Sabzawārī (1797-1873) also denied the possibility of a rational knowledge of God. Sabzawārī believed that the natural light of the human reason, when intensified by the divine Light, would be capable of knowledge of God through ‘arguments’, although he also emphasized that the very Essence of God cannot be known ‘exhaustively’, since any ‘acquired knowledge aimed at fathoming the depth’ (‘ilm al-iktināhī) would be possible only through the comprehensive acquisition of the essence of the ‘object’ supposed to be known, which is impossible in the case of God Who ‘by definition’ transcends any knowable ‘essence’ (māhiyya). It is worth mentioning that Sabzawārī enriched his arguments with insightful observations taken from Hadith literature and other traditional sources.

Keywords

• acquired knowledge (‘ilm al-husūlī)
• knowledge aimed at fathoming the depth (‘ilm al-iktināhī)
• ta’tīl (divesting God of His Attributes)
• Hakīm Sabzawārī