ABŪ HANĪFA AND THE LEGAL LOGIC OF 2ND/8TH CENTURY IRAQ

Abstract

This article explores how Abū Ḥanīfa balanced the two concepts of qiyās (analogy) and istiḥsān (juristic preference) to fashion a legal logic that esteemed analogical consistency while simultaneously recognizing its dangers and occasionally departing from it. It first argues that Iraqi legal logic was defined by an ambitious view of qiyās best termed analogical structuralism. It then argues that Iraqis also recognized the limitations of qiyās, particularly in its potential to conflict with a hadith/sunna or to lead to absurd results. In these cases, Iraqis made exceptions to qiyās, calling those exceptions istiḥsān. I show how Abū Ḥanīfa similarly struck this balance and how he espoused a surprisingly subjective conception of istiḥsān, one from which even his students retreated. Overall, this paper hopes to show how Abū Ḥanīfa represents a unique inflection point in the development of Islamic legal logic just before the rise of the Shafii paradigm.