Mimesis, fiction, paradoxes

Abstract

Like Renaissance poetics, contemporary theories of fiction do favour a conception of mimesis based on likelihood. In order to underscore the benefits of fiction, in terms of cognition or ethics, both ancient and present-day authors usually identify imitation (however this is understood) as a kind of rationality. The aim of this article is to question the status of contradictions and impossibilities, first in current theories of fiction (J-M Schaeffer, M.-L. Ryan, L. Doležel), then in two sixteenth century comments of Aristotle (by L. Castelvetro and F. Patrizi). In the following steps, forms and functions of the impossible are studied in three narratives of the Renaissance. The main hypothesis here is the following: in Renaissance fiction, paradoxes allow to conceive non-existing objects in the line of scholastic philosophy and in relationship with religious issues, seriously or mockingly envisioned. Consequently, paradoxes, being inherently reflexive, provide Renaissance fiction with auto-reference. Then as nowadays, the conception of fiction is displayed in very different ways in theories and narratives.

Keywords

• Aristotle
• Aneau Barthelemy
• Castelvetro Lodovico
• Doležel Lubomir
• fiction
• Helisenne de Crenne