Cosmological argument by R. Gale and A. Pruss: advantages and problems

Abstract

This article gives a detailed analysis of the cosmological argument proposed in 1999 by Richard Gale and Alexander Pruss, which they called the “new cosmological argument”. The initial section of article examines the system of concepts employed by Gale and Pruss: “possible worlds”, Big Conjunctive Fact, Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact, etc. Then the argument itself is examined. Gale and Pruss build it on the weak principle of suffi cient foundation and come to the conclusion about the existence of God, who is essentially a free necessary being and possesses power and reason only suffi cient to create our world but not all the sublime features attributed to God. The argument consists of 18 steps, where three parts can be distinguished. The fi rst is the proof that there exists the contingent proposition q which explains the Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact p of the actual world (steps 1‒7). The second part is that q notifi es about the intended action (intentional act) of the necessary being, which explains the existence of our world (steps 8‒15). Finally, in the third part (steps 16‒18) Gale and Pruss refer to such features as the orderliness of cosmos, fi ne tuning, unity of the Universe and suppose that the necessary being that created our world is very powerful, intelligent and kind. The article shows that most critical remarks about this argument are directed against its fi rst part. However, these remarks can easily be answered by Gale and Pruss’ argument. At the same time, the second part of the argument seems to be most vulnerable because, fi rstly, it contains a hidden prerequisite of a libertarian interpretation of the freedom of will and, secondly, does not exclude the possibility of retrogression to infi nity.

Keywords

• космологический аргумент
• принцип достаточного основания
• свобода воли
• Р. Гейл
• А. Прусс
• сущностно свободное необходимое сущее