Value Expectation and Value Endowment: A Matching Game Model of Labor Relations for University Teachers

Abstract

In the period of market-oriented transformation, the underlying logic of labor relations for university teachers involves a game of different values. Value expectation is reflected in the judgment and estimation of value return at the level of labor subjects' consciousness, while value endowment represents the degree of institutional support for the labor process. Based on the labor theory of value and the institutional theory of value, this paper deeply analyzes the relationship between individuals, labor value, and institutions. It constructs a game model of labor relations for university teachers based on value games, with value endowment and value expectation as the horizontal and vertical coordinates. The model reveals four basic quadrant relationships in the labor relations of university teachers: high value expectation and high value endowment; high value expectation and low value endowment; low value expectation and high value endowment; low value expectation and low value endowment. Through qualitative interviews, it is found that when the relationship between individuals, labor value, and institutions is mutually coordinated, the "double high" model represented by high value expectation and high value endowment is the optimal game model in labor relations. Conversely, there may be stability defects in labor relations, highlighting the coexistence problem of "individuals and institutions." Therefore, establishing harmonious labor relations for university teachers requires strengthening the inherent symbiotic logic between individuals, labor value, and institutions, reversing the disorder of value, returning to the rationality of value, and then improving the adaptability of value endowment and value expectation.

Keywords

• university teachers
• labor relations
• value expectation
• value endowment
• scarce resources
• game dilemma