Reflection on the Mind and Body Problem from Rorty's Pragmatic Point of View

Abstract

The present article studies Rorty’s pragmatic attitude to the mind-body problem. This project expresses itself along two axes: his critical attitude to the Cartesian conception of the mind as mirror of nature, and his pragmatic idea of the man named non-reductive physicalism. Based on historicism, he shows that there is an epistemic gap between philosophical paradigms, and each of them and the problems arising from them depend on the historical conditions and are optional. In addition, he makes it clear that the problem of mind is the result of presupposing the assumptions of historical origin, which have been chosen for non-epistemic causes in the same particular historic period. Therefore, the traditional conception of knowledge and mind may be replaced by a pragmatic conception of knowledge, which is a matter of conversation, of social practice, and a pragmatic idea of the man, that is, materialism without mind and body identity.

Keywords

• mind-body problem
• pragmatic attitude
• historicism
• optional
• materialism without mind-body identity