Is The Fine-Tuning Argument Theistic?

Abstract

I intend to show that the fine-tuning argument is not a theistic one, and is therefore not desirable for the theist. I will argue that (1) if the fine-tuning of the cosmos exceeds that which is required for the existence of human beings, it would not be helpful to the believer to prove the existence of God. (2) From the theist’s point of view, there are two objections to the fine-tuning argument: first, the extravagance objection, which states that this argument also includes other improbable events as evidence for the existence of God, though the theist does not mean that. Second, the backfire objection, which states that the advocate of fine-tuning reasoning defeats her/his purpose. Third, the fine-tuning argument assumes that the occurrence of an unlikely event requires a different explanation than the occurrence of probable events, and this is a false presupposition, which leads to the “God of the gaps” objection. The theist independently does not accept this distinction; she/he believes that the explanation of both probable and improbable events equally requires assuming the existence of God. So, since the fine-tuning argument is based on assumptions that are inconsistent with theism, the theist should not find it worrisome that the fine-tuning argument is not a successful one.

Keywords

• argument from design
• fine-tuning
• theism
• god of the gaps