Is This a Metaphor? On the Difficult Task of Identifying Metaphors in Scientific Discourse

Abstract

This article focuses on the problem of metaphor identification in scientific language. In Conceptual Metaphor Theory, metaphors are often observed on the conceptual level. As in this framework there is no genuine linguistic definition of metaphor, problems occur in empirical work where metaphor identification in texts is required. Although there seems to be considerable agreement in intuitive judgements, most empirical work lacks a method which produces transparent and repeatable data. I will argue that a mixture of two possible identification strategies is often used intuitively: the “truth approach”, which marks as metaphorical expressions that are not actually true, and the “meaning approach” that takes the difference between primary and secondary meaning into account. While these intuitive identification strategies might be useful in some discourses, serious problems occur when metaphors have to be identified in scientific language. This is because in scientific theories “truth” is not easily identified and the meaning of a scientific term is sometimes not obvious. I argue for a methodological clear-cut distinction of the two possible approaches to metaphor identification, and for a careful reflection of the possible consequences of the different identification strategies.