Prirodzené morálne cnosti podľa Jána Dunsa Scota

Abstract

The article presents the prerequisites and primary characteristics of Duns Scotus’ understanding of natural moral virtues. It presents the main arguments of Scotus that led to the modification of the Aristotelian approach to moral virtues in the following areas: honing the notion of virtue as the habit of choice, reducing the causal role of virtues, the secondary significance of virtue in the definition of moral good, reducing virtues to modes of willpower, questioning the connection between prudence and moral virtues, the easing of the mutual connection of virtues and, finally, the partialisation of prudence. The context of modification forms the difference between nature and will and the theory of natural law, which establishes the moral good. The article points out the historical and systematic context of Scotus’ ethics and the evaluation of its contribution to the consideration of virtues.

Keywords

• reason
• will
• natural law
• virtue
• connection of moral virtues
• prudence
• john duns scotus