Specificità e modelli di governo delle banche: un’analisi degli assetti proprietari dei gruppi bancari italiani (Specificity and Models of Banking Governance: An Analysis of the Ownership Structure of the Italian Banking Groups)

Abstract

This paper aims at discussing the specificity of the banking governance and analysing the ownership structure of the Italian banking groups. Summing up, the theses here argued are: 1) the specificity of the banking activity restricts the role of stockholders, creditors and markets as channels of governance, while magnifying the role of regulation and authorities; 2) it is not possible to define a sole optimal model of banking governance; however, the market in which the bank is called to operate and the interests judged deserving of protection make some models of governance less suitable than others; 3) the models of banking governance currently more diffused in Italy are those of public banks, controlled by banking foundations, and of mutual and co-operative banks; 4) among the larger Italian banking groups there are heavy cross shareholdings, whereas they are weak among the regional banking groups; the sharing by Italian regional banks of larger banks' capital is increasing. JEL Codes: G21, G34, G32 Keywords: Banking, Governance, Ownership Structure, Ownership, Stockholder

Keywords

• Banking
• Governance
• Ownership Structure
• Ownership
• Stockholder