Do Dynamic Signals Affect High-Quality Solvers’ Participation Behavior? Evidence from the Crowdsourcing Platform

Abstract

The emergence of the crowdsourcing platform enables seekers to obtain higher-quality services at lower costs. High-quality services are often provided by high-quality solvers, which is the key to the sustainable development of crowdsourcing platforms. Therefore, how to attract more high-quality solvers to participate needs to be focused on. Most previous studies that used stock data to measure crowdsourcing performance failed to describe the contest process of high-quality solvers’ behavior. Different from the previous study, this paper explores the information signals that influence the participation of high-quality solvers in the dynamic process of crowdsourcing contests. Based on the creative projects of the Winvk platform, dynamic models affecting the participation of high-quality solvers are constructed from the perspective of reducing information asymmetry, and the effects of quality signals and intention signals are explored in depth. The results show that for logo design projects, clear information display and monetary mechanisms have a significant impact on alleviating information asymmetry and attracting the participation of high-quality solvers. Interestingly, the effect of market competition on high-quality solvers shows a U-shaped change. The research results provide a reference for enterprises to reduce information asymmetry, obtain high-quality solutions, and enrich the theoretical application in the field of crowdsourcing.

Keywords

• crowdsourcing platform
• high-quality solvers
• signaling theory
• quality signals
• intention signals