Coopetitive Games for Management of Marine Transportation Activity: A Study Case

Abstract

In this paper, we will use coopetitive game theory to analyze a case of real coopetition among port companies, for what concerns loading and unloading of goods, within a competitive management scenario of marine transportation activities. Our research consists of the analysis of a study case involving coopetition between two real companies from which we obtained the financial and contractual data allowing us to define two modeling payoff functions, both of them based on real agreements and tariffs. We recognize actual coopetition and an asymmetric R&D alliance in this type of agreement, where a bigger enterprise deals with a smaller competitor, in order to capture more value from their activities. In particular, our model will show a precise coopetitive bi-dimensional trajectory within which we suggest, after a quantitative analysis, different kinds of solutions: the purely coopetitive solution, a Kalai-Smorodinsky solution and, finally, a transferable utility Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. Our methods provide specific strategy procedures determining win-win solutions for both.

Keywords

• game theory
• non-cooperative games
• coopetition
• management of marine transportation activity
• R&amp
• D asymmetric alliance