Problems with the assessment of shame and guilt

Abstract

Moral emotions play a significant role in human behavior, and yet scholars are not unanimous in defining, differentiating, and measuring the basic moral experiences: shame and guilt. Because of this problem, the theory goes far beyond the empirical research on these emotions. In this article we analyze the most widely accepted points of view on the difference between guilt and shame; those who espouse each point of view suggest their own assessment tools. Thus, one of the often-used methods, the Test of Self-Conscious Affect-3 (TOSCA-3) (Tangney, Dearing, Wagner, & Gramzow, 2000), is based on a theory that differentiates shame and guilt according to where the negative evaluation of the misbehavior is aimed (at one’s actions or at one’s self). Another widely used questionnaire, the Dimensions of Conscience Questionnaire (DCQ) (Johnson et al., 1987), differentiates these emotions on the basis of whether the event causing them is public or personal. The latest studies have shown that those methods are not contradictory. In addition, both the TOSCA-3 and the DCQ have their disadvantages; for example, they do not differentiate between emotional and behavioral aspects of guilt and shame. Thus, there is a need to develop a new assessment scale that overcomes these disadvantages. One such scale is the Guilt and Shame Proneness Scale (GASP) (Cohen, Wolf, Panter, & Insko, 2011). The research conducted by its authors has established its reliability and validity, which allow us to consider the GASP as a progressive tool in assessing moral emotions, one that has great theoretical and practical value.

Keywords

• shame
• guilt
• moral emotions
• psychological assessment tools
• TOSCA-3
• GASP